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Abstract: Conditional cash transfer programs have been widely deployed across the globe.
They seek to bolster human capital by providing benefits contingent upon a variety of actions
such as school attendance and regular health checkups. Bolsa Familia is the most extensive
conditional cash transfer program, serving 46 million Brazilian citizens. Despite its expansive
size, there have been seldom large-scale micro evaluations of the program. Limited data has
resulted in small sample sizes drawn from a single point in time. Our study diverges from the
rest and utilizes a novel administrative dataset with an overall sample of nearly 60 million and
a period of four years. We first examine the impact that Bolsa Familia has on school
enrollment by establishing a baseline relationship via a fixed effect linear probability model.
Then, we utilize fuzzy regression discontinuity approach that evaluates the school outcomes
of families right above and below the income threshold. Initial linear probability regressions
find that Bolsa Familia consistently reduces the risk of a child not being in school by around
11% for those currently enrolled. Our fuzzy regression discontinuity approach amplifies these
results, suggesting that Bolsa Familia leads to a 53% reduction in dropout. Further, we find
reductions in school non-enrollment rates amongst all ages, despite much of the literature
only pointing to reductions for older children.

1. Introduction
Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs are often heralded as the anti-poverty
model of choice for many nations. Since the late 1990s, these programs have witnessed an
exponential uptake, with much of Latin America and the Caribbean implementing some form
of CCT. The program is laid out as such: money is transferred to beneficiaries conditional
upon their compliance with a set criterion of human-capital investments such as sending their
children to school and attending regular health checkups. CCT’s help boost both short-term
welfare by providing a means of income smoothing, along with long-term macro-level human
capital accumulation by requiring investments in education and health. Research also
indicates that they have had positive effects in the realm of health (Rasella, et al., 2013; Shei,
2013; Paes-Sousa, et al., 2011), education (Glewwe, et al., 2012; De Brauw, et al., 2015;
Schaffland, 2011), female empowerment (De Brauw, et al., 2014), and lowering crime (Chioda,
et al., 2016; Loureiro, 2012; Alves, et al., 2019). This particular study aims to look at the
educational effects of Bolsa Familia, the most extensive CCT program in the world.
Bolsa Familia is currently the largest CCT program in the world, delivering monetary
support to nearly 11.1 million families (over 46 million Brazilian citizens) with a budget of
US$11.2 Billion (Cirkovic, 2019). It was founded in 2003 and originated as the composition
of four transfer programs that each had their own emphasis (“promoting schooling, health
care, compensating for fewer price subsidies or promoting food consumption”) but similar
target populations (Lindert, et al., 2007, p.13). In hopes to expand Brazil’s social safety net
and create a more efficient system, President Lula combined the four programs into what is
now known as Bolsa Familia. At its genesis, it was aimed at impoverished families with
children in the household. As of 2014, eligibility was determined by having children under
the age of 17 and a monthly income of less than R$154 (see Appendix A for complete benefit
timeline and Appendix B for an example of benefits received by a fictitious family). The
transfer of the cash is contingent upon school attendance by each child in the household, with
85% attendance expected for children between the ages of 6 and 15 and 75% attendance for
children between 16 and 17.
Furthermore, the benefit amount goes up with age, as it is believed that older children
have a higher opportunity cost of being in school. Data on compliance is obtained from
schools reporting to their local municipalities who then disclose the information to the
Ministry of Social Development (MDS). The funds for the program are distributed via
electronic benefit cards that are preferentially given to a female head-of-household. In 2007,
it was estimated that “93% of legally responsible beneficiaries were women” (Lindert et al.,
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2007, p. 17). Our data reinforces this trend, finding that 94.21% of recipient households are
female-headed. By providing cash transfers to a household contingent upon a minimum
school attendance rate, it acts as an incentive to prioritize education. However, Bolsa Familia
was not rolled out in a randomized fashion like Oportunidades (Mexico) and Bono de
Desarollo Humano (Ecuador), which makes drawing conclusions on causality challenging.
Further, many of the studies available have not had access to large-scale microdata, but
rather, only one round of the National Household Survey (PNAD) from 2006, which included
Bolsa Familia questions. Our study employs a never-before-used administrative dataset that
spans four years and includes demographic information on both Bolsa Familia recipients and
those who did not qualify for the program. With nearly 18.5 million observations we are able
to garner precise estimates of the program’s impact.
We first estimate the underlying relationship between Bolsa Familia and school
enrollment by conducting a linear probability (LP) model with a vector of demographic
controls and year and state fixed effects. We find that Bolsa Familia reduces a child’s risk of
dropping out by nearly -11%, helping to keep approximately 60,627 children in school who
would have otherwise dropped out. Once we establish a strong negative relationship between
school dropout rate and Bolsa Familia, we utilize our next econometric model, a fuzzy
regression discontinuity (RDD). This quasi-experimental approach assesses the differences
in school enrollment for children belonging to families that receive Bolsa Familia benefits
compared to children in families who do not. By limiting our average income window to those
who fall within R$18 above and below the threshold, we can compare observations that
should otherwise be statistically similar, with the only difference being Bolsa Familia
enrollment. Therefore, if different school outcomes are observed between those right above
the cutoff and those right below, we can confidently conclude the disparity is a result of the
CCT program. The RDD results indicate that being currently enrolled in Bolsa Familia
reduces the risk of dropping out by -53%. The estimates are significant at the 1% level and
are robust across a variety of tests. We conclude that Bolsa Familia is a highly effective
program and is achieving its goal of bolstering human capital.
Our study contributes to the existing literature in that it employs a novel dataset that
has never been used for academic research. To our knowledge, this is the first study of this
magnitude to assess how Bolsa Familia influences school enrollment. Not only do we assess
the overall impact of Bolsa Familia but we also examine the heterogeneity in results across
different age groups. Most of the literature has pointed to older children realizing the benefits
of CCT programs, with little impact amongst primary schoolers. Our results diverge from
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the literature in that we see meaningful reductions in dropout rates amongst all ages, with
Bolsa Familia leading to nearly a -55% reduction for primary schoolers, and a -35% reduction
for high schoolers. Witnessing meaningful reductions across all age groups reinforces the
utilization of CCT’s as means in which to build up a nation’s human capital.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of
the literature, Section 3 introduces the data and key variables, Section 4 highlights the
econometric models used, Section 5 presents the empirical results, and Section 6 discusses
the implications of this study and ideas for future research.

2 Literature Review
2.1 Macroeconomic ideas of education
To fully understand the theory backing CCT’s, we must revert to the foundational
macroeconomic literature, which helps explain why it would be in the interest of a nationstate to invest in education. Within the field, there is a consensus that increased schooling
has positive effects on sustainable economic development through various channels.
Emerging in the late 1980s, endogenous growth theory posits that investment in human
capital is an essential factor in development and improving the standard of living. As its name
suggests, endogenous growth contends that economic growth occurs within the system
rather than through exogenous forces, which was in direct contrast to previous neoclassical
thought that considered external factors as a predictor for growth. For instance, neoclassical
theory postulated that innovation was exogenous while, in endogenous growth theory,
innovation was dependent upon the stock of knowledge present within the country, and the
R&D required to bolster it (Romer, 1986).
Unlike the Solow model, endogenous growth theory posits that innovation is
endogenous and dependent upon the stock of knowledge (Romer, 1986). Therefore, we can
use policy intervention to increase investment in human capital and research to alter the longrun growth rates of a country. This model was undoubtedly in the minds of many
policymakers and scientists responsible for the influx of CCT programs in the late 1990s and
early 2000s, as it required massive investments in education and health, two primary
components of human capital.
Another way in which education can lead to growth is through the spillover effects it
ushers in (Nelson & Phelps, 1966). Endogenous growth theory also recognizes this channel
and emphasizes how investment in human capital and R&D can affect a country’s ability to
capitalize on positive externalities and spillover effects or its absorptive capacity (i.e., it must
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have some baseline human capital stock to benefit from imitative behavior). More technology
will be implemented and diffused into society as education increases and it is dependent upon
the gap between the theoretical stock of technology and the actual level of technology being
used in production (Nelson & Phelps, 1966). Not only will the individuals who receive the
education benefit, but also those who do not will reap the externality of being able to imitate
the techniques tested by others. Macro-level models not only highlight the individual
benefits of schooling but also the societal advantages of having an educated populous.
2.2 Underinvestment in education
If education plays a role in bolstering country-level growth, and creating positive
spillover effects, then why is there such underinvestment in school and a mismatch of the
perceived value between households and the government? One possible explanation is that
education takes on a quasi-public good form due to the externalities it produces. While
education may not always be a perfect fit into the public good typology (non-rivalrous
consumption, and non-excludability), general knowledge falls into this category, something
that education produces (Stiglitz, 1999). Schooling directly benefits the individual receiving
it via an increase in their lifetime earnings, better health, and marriage market outcomes
(Oreopoulos & Salvanes, 2011). But it also can spillover to others through promoting a stable
and democratic environment, increased human rights, more social cohesion, less crime, and
the spread of new technology (Glaeser, et al., 2007; Grossman, 2006; Becker & Lewis, 1973;
Dee, 2004). In taking the difference between these private and public benefits, it is easy to
conceptualize that the cumulative positive externalities generated by schooling are vast and
may exceed the private benefits, which firmly cement it into the realm of a quasi-public good.
Unfortunately, a common feature among public goods is their under-provision due to the
non-internalization of the positive externalities. A mismatch is created between the private
and social optimum because the market does not allow the individual who received the
schooling to realize the external benefits it reaped on others. This is especially true in
communities where there may not be labor market opportunities that reward more schooling,
making the returns to education very low, further exacerbating its under-investment.
This disparity between the private and social optima leads to a coordination failure,
which is often thought of at a macro level. However, we can redefine coordination failures to
be household-specific, where the price of school exceeds the utility derived from it. These
coordination failures can result in one or more Nash equilibria that are not Pareto optimal,
such as a family not sending their child to school and their neighbors also not doing so. The
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primary problem is then how to move from this point to a Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium
in the face of coordination failure. It is, therefore, necessary that we have some sort of
mechanism that corrects the private undervaluation of education.
2.3 Theory of the conditional cash transfer
The conditional cash transfer (CCT) is one such way of correcting for these market
failures. Through a cash incentive, households are induced to adjust their behavior to the
social optimum. Essentially, the transfer acts as a price effect on the action of schooling.
Rather than the typical notion of a price effect, which assesses how market prices influence
demand for a product, the cash transfer encourages an increase in the supply of an action (De
Janvry & Sadoulet, 2005). The increase in the price for the action is a mechanism that helps
reward the household for the externalities of education that are not captured by market forces
due to its quasi-public-good structure. CCT’s should be viewed as a contract between
households conditional upon the delivery of an action (school), which bridges the social and
private optimum.
This opportunity cost of attending school can also help explain why we witness such
disparities in school enrollment for older versus younger children. If the fallback option is
outside work or production within the household, then younger children would have a very
low opportunity cost because the child’s potential income stream would be minimal.
Therefore, delayed enrollment would be non-optimal. Older children would have a higher
opportunity cost because their outside options increase (De Janvry & Sadoulet, 2005).
Further, even if their labor market alternatives are seldom, they are often kept home to
supervise younger siblings who are not of school age. This helps explain why we often see an
increase in transfer size as children get older.
There is no doubt that education plays a crucial role in sustainable economic
development by enhancing human capital accumulation. Policymakers are well aware of the
benefits that education reaps in on individuals and the general population. However, despite
its positive spillovers, we see widespread underinvestment in education. The reasoning for
this is that it takes on a quasi-public good nature and does not allow individuals to internalize
the positive externalities it produces (Anttila-Hughes, 2020). This creates a mismatch
between the private and public valuation of school and explains why we see such educational
disparities around the globe. With this in mind, many policymakers have cultivated
innovative solutions to bridge the gap in valuation. One such method has been CCTs. The
transfer acts as a price effect on the action of attending school and raises the individual utility
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garnered from education. This mechanism corrects for the misaligned social and private
optima. Not only has its effects been discussed in much of the theory literature, but it has also
been evaluated in rigorous empirical studies.
2.4 Applied research on CCT’s and education in Latin America
When studying Bolsa Familia, it is important to observe the educational outcomes
found in neighboring nations with similar initiatives. To begin, arguably, one of the most
widely examined CCT programs is Progresa (currently Prospera), which was rolled out in
Mexico in 1997. Progresa is often the blueprint used for other CCT’s implemented across
Latin America. Progresa is considered a CCT program that offers families below a specific
income threshold grants contingent upon them keeping their children in school for 85% of
the school year. Like many other CCT’s the grant size varies based on particular child
characteristics, as the opportunity cost of keeping children in school differs with their age
and gender. What makes this governmental program unique is its implementation. To ensure
accurate impact evaluations, the program was randomly enacted in 314 of the 495 localities
during the first two years, with the remaining locations receiving the program in the third
year. This allowed evaluations of the program to take a quasi-experimental approach. Taking
advantage of this exogeneity, Schultz (2004) conducted a study aimed at evaluating if school
enrollment rates were statistically different between control villages and treatment villages.
The authors found a 0.66 difference or about two-thirds of a year increase in children who
were recipients of the grant than children who had not yet received funding. While the shortterm impacts of Progresa seem to be effective, other studies have attempted to see if the
results are upheld over a longer span of time. One study found that after five-and-a-half years
of receiving benefits, there is still a positive effect on school attainment (Behrman, Parker, &
Todd 2011). Mexico’s success with Progresa undoubtedly encouraged other countries to
deploy similar programs in an attempt to boost their own stock of human capital.
Brazil has also witnessed successful educational outcomes for families enrolled in the
short-run and long-run. A paper by Schaffland (2011) utilized data from the 2006 PNAD (the
National Household Survey) and employed a propensity score methodology which matches
two individuals, one that is enrolled, and the other not enrolled, but both with the same
probability of being in the program, conditional on certain observable characteristics (income
variables, characteristics of the child, characteristics of the household head, etc.). By using
this approach, the authors determine children predicted to be enrolled in BFP had an increase
in school enrollment of 4-5%. However, this result appears to become weaker as time goes
on, with school enrollment rates falling by 1.18% over time. Though, the overall impact of
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Bolsa Familia on schooling remains positive throughout time, reinforcing the literature that
posits the long-term success of CCT’s.
Another heavily studied CCT, Familias en Acción (FA), was enacted in 2001 in
Colombia. To improve child nutrition, school enrollment, and household consumption,
eligibility was determined by falling beneath a certain income threshold and contingent upon
keeping children in school for 80% of the school year and attending regular growth and
development check-ups. Like many other programs, including Bolsa Familia, the grant given
to families increased as children got older. To examine the causal effect on school attendance,
Attanasio et al. (2005) collected data from household surveys conducted across municipalities
that received FA funding and municipalities that did not. In order to perform a difference-indifference approach, the authors selected municipalities that were extremely similar in sociodemographic, economic, population, and urbanization realms but only differed in having
access to a bank (the reason for FA not being present). The results indicate that FA did not
significantly change enrollment rates for children in grades 8-11 but had a significant
difference in enrollment for children aged 12-17. Confirming their hypothesis that the cash
transfer can help increase the utility derived from schooling, correcting for the private
undervaluation of education.
Bolsa Familia has also shown similar results in the program being more effective for
older children. De Brauw et al. (2015) assessed 11,000 households, with some enrolled in
Bolsa Familia and others not. The authors implement a propensity-score weighted regression
to assess differences in schooling for urban vs. rural and older vs. younger children. Similar
to the prior study, they uncover that the largest positive impacts on schooling are seen by
older children aged 15-17, perpetuating the theory that opportunity cost increases with age.
Thus, the cash transfer will largely change the behavior of older children who would have
dropped out of school without the transfer, while younger children would remain in school
with or without it.
Many Latin American countries have experienced increased human capital as a result
of their CCT’s. Even though the educational outcomes may show a greater level of
significance in the short- run than the long-run and for older rather than younger children,
there is certainly an overarching consensus of the positive effects that CCT’s exhibit.

3. Data and Measurement of Variables
To apply for Bolsa Familia, families must be registered within the Cadastro Unico
system (CADUNICO), a central database that determines eligibility for nearly twenty-five
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transfer programs in addition to Bolsa Familia. Thus, the registry contains information on
those who qualified for Bolsa Familia and those who were just above the income threshold.
The formulation of the registry was initially constructed to streamline targeting of
beneficiaries, prevent duplication of benefits, and reduce administrative costs. Each of the
5,564 municipalities is responsible for registering families into the database and conducting
interviews that garner information on household composition, income level, and other
demographic features (Lindert et al., 2007). All beneficiaries are required to complete the
survey every two years in order to continue to receive transfers. Our study utilizes the
administrative data from CADUNICO for its analysis and takes advantage of its panel data
structure. This dataset has never been used for academic research and its purpose was solely
for administrative tracking. The magnitude of this dataset is unprecedented regarding public
information available on Bolsa Familia, making this study one of a kind. Overall, the dataset
contains nearly 1.2 billion observations that include every single Bolsa Familia payment
made. However, for our analysis, we collapse the payment data to a measure of yearly
enrollment and limit our period of interest to 2014-2017. We end up with a sample of
approximately 60,452,388 observations. It is comprised of demographic information and
household composition features that were gathered at the time of the survey. Table 1 provides
an overview of demographic characteristics categorized by Bolsa Familia enrollment.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable (%)
Average income
Female
Age
Literate
Female household head
Household size
Household head literate

Total Sample
146.25
57.84
27.66
81.64%
92.69%
3.13
89.03%

BFP Recipients
70.47
60.79
25.25
81.59%
94.21%
3.38
89.67%

Non-BFP Recipients
285.21
39.21
30.77
81.95%
89.53%
2.68
87.70%

The educational outcomes captured in the dataset include a question asked of whether
each member of the household “goes to school currently,” with the responses ranging from
“yes,” “no, but has gone in the past” and “never went to school.” We define our measurement
of not in school as children over the age of 7 and under the age of 17 who have reported “never
went to school” and “no but has gone in the past.” In Brazil, children must be enrolled in
school by the age of seven, however, guardians are encouraged to enroll their children
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starting at six years old (UNESCO, 2020). This is why we chose to include children seven
years and older in our sample. ‘Not in school’ is the primary outcome variable utilized in the
empirical models. Table 2 provides an overview of school enrollment rates conditional on
particular qualities.
Table 2: School enrollment
Not in school
Variable
Total not in school
Not in school by age
Primary School Age
Lower secondary school age
Upper secondary school age
Not in school by gender
Female
Male
Not in school by BFP participation
Not enrolled
Currently enrolled
Currently and previously enrolled
Under 10
Not enrolled
Currently enrolled
Currently and previously enrolled
Between 10-13
Not enrolled
Currently enrolled
Currently and previously enrolled
Over 13
Not enrolled
Currently enrolled
Currently and previously enrolled

95% Confidence interval

Percent
3.63

Lower bound
3.62

Upper bound
6.63

6.90
1.14
3.37

6.88
1.13
3.35

6.92
1.15
3.38

3.70
3.55

3.69
3.54

3.71
3.57

3.35
2.97
2.50

3.34
2.96
2.49

3.37
2.98
2.51

5.61
4.53
3.94

5.57
4.51
3.92

5.65
4.56
3.96

1.16
0.71
0.59

1.14
0.70
0.59

1.17
0.72
0.60

3.47
3.46
2.86

3.45
3.45
2.85

3.49
3.48
2.88

At first glance, we do see a difference in school rates for recipients versus nonrecipients. Children who do not belong to families that receive benefits are out of school at
slightly higher rates (3.35%) than children belonging to beneficiary families (2.97%). Further,
we investigate whether being enrolled for two consecutive terms makes a difference. By
restricting our sample to include those were enrolled in the last period of observation, we see
that children belonging to this category have the lowest rate of not being in school (2.50%).
This could be attributed a learning mechanism, where families that have been in the program
in a prior period are more aware of the program stipulations or have successfully altered their
behavior more so than households that have only been enrolled for one period.
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Table 2 also reveals that the highest rates of school non-enrollment are amongst
primary-aged children (6.90%). We speculate that this is because there is a lag in the time it
takes families to enroll their young children into the school system. Lower secondary school
age is when most children are enrolled in school, but once they reach upper secondary school,
the unenrollment rates begin to climb again. Figure 1 summarizes the average number of
children reported as not being in school, plotted against age. It is divided by program
participation highlighting the differentials between children belonging to families who
received Bolsa Familia transfers and families who did not.
Figure 1: Not in school by age

Initially, we do see that individuals who belong to families that are not enrolled in
Bolsa Familia are out of school at the highest rates. Further, we witness that those who are
currently enrolled in Bolsa Familia and were enrolled in the last unit of observation have the
highest school enrollment averages amongst all ages. Prior to running any econometric
models, the raw data does point to an interesting pattern.
Next, our treatment variable is enrollment in Bolsa Familia. The measure was
constructed by observing monthly payment data. We created a binary indicator variable that
was 1 if the individual received a transfer. If the individual never received a transfer, it was 0.
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There was often the case where the transfer would stop and later resume. When this occurred,
we continued to mark that individual as enrolled. In our LP and RDD model, we use a
contemporaneous measure of Bolsa Familia enrollment. What this means is that the
individual was reported as enrolled at the time we observe their school outcomes. Our
primary model utilizes contemporaneous enrollment, as the threshold is much more
pronounced and exhibited a stronger first-stage result than using the lagged version
(discussed in greater detail in section 4.2Table 3 highlights basic Bolsa Familia enrollment
statistics.
Table 3: Bolsa Familia Enrollment Statistics
Enrolled in BFP
Not enrolled in BFP
Currently and previously enrolled

Frequency
40,852,018
19,600,370
34,468,188

Percent
67.58
32.42
57.02

The average income variable has been calculated by the Brazilian government based on the
income composition features reported in the CADUNICO filing such as income from work,
unemployment benefits, child support, donations, etc. The final calculated number is what is used
to determine if an individual is eligible for the program. We utilize the average income variable in our
RDD approach to help predict enrollment. The maximum per capita monthly household income
threshold has changed numerous times throughout the years. In 2014, it increased from R$140 to
R$154, and in 2016 it increased to R$170 (see Appendix A for complete benefit timeline and
Appendix C for a graphical representation of the changing threshold). We also construct a binary
measurement that captures whether the individual’s average income fell above or below the
threshold in the year in which they applied for the program. This is an additional variable that we
employ to predict Bolsa Familia enrollment in the first stage of our RDD.

4. Empirical Model and Hypotheses
4.1 Linear Probability Model
Before moving into the primary identification strategy of an RDD, it is important to
establish the relationships between our variables of interest. Firstly, we restrict the sample
to include only the conditional portion of Bolsa Familia. Being a linear probability (LP)
model, the outcome variable is a binary indicator of whether a child is currently not in school
and the independent variable of interest is Bolsa Familia enrollment. The LP model allows
12

us to estimate the probability of !! (not being in school) occurring, given, "! (being enrolled
in Bolsa Familia and our control variables). Thus, the two outcomes represent the event
occurring #! = !! = 1, or not occurring(1 − #! ) = !! = 0 . The model takes the form of:
*(!! |"! ) = #! = , + ∑ /" "! , where # is the probability that the child will not be in school.
Additional control variables incorporated in the model include age, gender (1=female,
0=male), and average income in logarithmic form. These aspects are incorporated into the
model because much research points to the increasing opportunity cost of schooling for older
children and females (De Brauw et al., 2015, De Janvry & Sadoulet, 2015; Emerson & Souza,
2007; Duryea, et al., 2007). By including these in our model, we will be able to determine if it
is an influencing factor. Finally, average income is utilized as a control because it influences
both Bolsa Familia enrollment and school outcomes; thus, omitting it would create biased
results.
The model is as follows
!! = #" + ## &# + #$ '() + #% ()*+), + #& '-),'() .*/01) + 2' + 3( + 4!

The Y variable comprises of the following measure:
•

Not in school: children between the ages of 7 to 17, who reported “never went to school”
and “no but have gone in the past”. It is coded as a “1” if they are not in school, and a
“0” if they are in school.

The "# variable comprises of the following measures
•

Currently enrolled in Bolsa Familia: the contemporaneous measure of enrollment.

Meaning, the unit was enrolled at the time we are checking the ‘not in school’
measure.
We also include a full set of state, 2' ,and year, 3( , fixed effects in all models. The
reasoning for including fixed effects is to eradicate any unobserved cross-sectional
heterogeneity. By taking the average of each individual over time and subtracting it from the
level each period, the omitted variation across groups has been ‘fixed,’ which removes the
unobserved heterogeneity between cross-sections, leaving us with within-state and year
variation, allowing for better identification of causal relationships. In total, we control for a
total of 26 states and four years.
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(1)

A fixed-effect method was chosen over random effects because the assumptions are a
bit laxer, allowing for covariance between the time-invariant portion of the error and our
regressors. To confirm this choice, we employ a Hausman test to ensure we are using the
most efficient estimator. We reject the null, meaning the difference in coefficients is
systematic, and the covariance is not equal to zero. The use of random effects would be biased,
making fixed effects the most appropriate model.
Finally, we cluster our standard errors, 1$ , by state. This adjustment helps correct if
school dropout rates are not uniformly distributed within each state (i.e.: observations are
correlated to each other within each group). We believe this is a likely scenario as factors
such as education policy are decided at the state level in Brazil.
4.2 Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity
A fuzzy regression discontinuity design (RDD) is employed to uncover the causal
relationship between Bolsa Familia participation and educational outcomes. This
methodology requires us to have exact knowledge of the conditions that lead to treatment
and a large sample size that includes participants and non-participants. The clear income
threshold for Bolsa Familia and our extensive dataset allows us to observe the outcomes of
those gathered right above and below the income cutoff. Our sample is restricted to the
conditional portion of the program and households with children and adolescents under the
age of seventeen. By analyzing households that fall within a very narrow window of monthly
income, we assume that they are statistically similar, with the only significant difference
being one receiving treatment (enrollment in Bolsa Familia) and the other being left
untreated (not enrolled in Bolsa Familia). To ensure the statistical similarity, we determine
an optimal window of analysis by generating a variety of data-driven bandwidth estimators
and select the one that gives us the largest range. We settle on a symmetric bandwidth of [18, 18].
An RDD design is an excellent methodology when you have a sharp cutoff between
treated and untreated, and there is total compliance on each side. However, because the
demographic information obtained is self-reported, there are likely households in the
untreated category receiving benefits and eligible families not receiving benefits. This could
be due to erroneous reporting on the civilian or governmental side. The mix around the
threshold requires us to implement an identification strategy that accounts for endogeneity
issues of partial compliance. An RDD allows for a cutoff point that is probabilistic rather than
deterministic. There still needs to be a discontinuity at the threshold, but it does not need to
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show perfect compliance. Figure 2 depicts the discontinuity between whether a family
received a transfer and their income relative to the qualification criteria in the year in which
they applied.

Percent currently enrolled

Figure 2: Program Discontinuity

Income cutoff
As suspected, Figure 2 indicates a jump in the probability of receiving Bolsa Familia
payments at the income threshold. Those that fall above it are much more likely to be nonrecipients, and those that fall below it appear more likely to receive benefits. Thus, we
implement an instrumental variable technique that isolates the treatment effect on
the compliers, or those who properly qualify and receive Bolsa Familia. Enrollment is
instrumented by average income and being below the threshold. Average income is a metric
calculated by the Brazilian government and includes various components reported by families
in their CADUNICO filing. It is an extremely complex measure to recreate, and all of our
attempts to backward engineer it failed. Because of this, we believe that it would
be very difficult for an applicant to know how to manipulate their answers to achieve an
average income that falls right below the threshold. Furthermore, the constantly changing
income criteria and extension rules would make it difficult for an applicant to anticipate future
cutoff values (see Appendix A for a complete timeline of threshold values). Therefore, we
argue that average income is a good instrument for enrollment. We utilize contemporaneous
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income to predict enrollment, meaning the most recently reported average income, as this
produced the largest discontinuity or best prediction of actually being enrolled. We did
explore the option of using a lagged version of income, meaning the unit’s average income
that was reported in the previous period. However, when establishing the initial
discontinuity, it was much weaker than the contemporaneous measure. Figure 3 depicts the
lagged versus contemporaneous discontinuities.

Figure 3: Lagged vs. Current Enrollment Discontinuity

Figure 3 illustrates that the contemporaneous measure is much better at predicting
enrollment, justifying our use of it in the model.
We use a fuzzy RDD design in which enrollment is instrumented by a family’s
calculated monthly average income relative to the threshed in the year they applied, a binary
measure of being above or below the cutoff, and an interaction term. The average income is
centered on zero, with a bandwidth of [-18,18]. We also include year and state fixed effects
in all models, helping to eradicate any unobserved cross-sectional heterogeneity. The model
is as follows:
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The <$ variable comprises of the following measure:
•

Enrollment: if a family was enrolled between 2014 through 2017. Coded as “1” if yes,
and coded as “0” if no.

The >$ variable comprises of the following measures
•

Centered average income: Average income is centered on the threshold in the year in
which they filed. It is restricted to 18 above the threshold and 18 below the threshold.

•

Below Threshold: a binary variable that indicates whether the family’s average income
fell below the threshold in the year in which they applied. It is coded as a “1” if they
are below the threshold, and a “0” if they are above.

•

Interaction: An interaction term between the centered average income and the binary
indicator of being below the threshold.

The !$ variable comprises of the following measure:
•

Not in school: children between the ages of 7 to 17, who reported “never went to school”
and “no but have gone in the past”. It is coded as a “1” if they are not in school, and a
“0” if they are in school.

The "$ covariate is the year and state fixed effects.
•

The year fixed effects include 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017. We control for 26 states.

In the first stage, we define >$ as an instrument for <$ . The variable, >$ , indicates whether
the household is eligible by using their centered monthly per capita income in the year of
application, a binary indicator of being below the threshold, and an interaction term between
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the two. Once we obtain our first stage estimate, we run the second stage which utilizes our
estimated <H$ that predicts whether a household has been treated. The parameter of interest is
/# and captures the effect of the Bolsa Familia on educational outcomes. We also utilize
triangular kernel weighting. This simply applies higher weights to the observations that are
closer to the income threshold, eliminating bias that stems from using data further away from
the cutoff point.
The effect uncovered will be the local average treatment effect (LATE). It isolates the
average impact of the treatment on the compliers or the average educational effect on the
individuals who qualified and received Bolsa Familia. It is derived by dividing the jump in the
regression of not being in school on the covariate to the jump in the regression of enrollment
on the covariate:
M=

D3N'↑) *[!$ = 1|>$ = P] − D3N'↓) *[!$ = 1|>$ = P]
D3N'↑) *[<$ = 1|>$ = P] − D3N'↓) *[<$ = 1|>$ = P]

(4)

Where the numerator is the difference in school outcomes (!$ ) for those with incomes right
below and right above the threshold (>$ ), and the denominator is the difference in the
enrollment (<$ ) for those with incomes right below and right above the threshold (>$ ).

5. Empirical Results
5.1 Linear Probability Model
Table 4 column (1) shows the LP regression results for Bolsa Familia’s impact on
school enrollment. It illustrates how contemporaneous enrollment (being currently enrolled)
in Bolsa Familia influences a child's risk of not being in school. The initial regression results
show a clear negative relationship between school dropout and being enrolled in Bolsa
Familia. In the model, the coefficient of our measures of enrollment was significantly different
from 0 at the 1% level. They moved in the opposite direction of our school outcome variable,
meaning that children in recipient families are more likely to be in school than children
belonging to non-enrolled families.
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Table 4: Linear probability regression with controls and state and year fixed effects
Dependent Variable: Not in school
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.0035***
(0.0005)
0.0018***
(0.0004)

-0.0034***
(0.0006)
0.0018 ***
(0.0004)
0.0007
(0.0009)

-0.0034***
(0.0005)
0.0014***
(0.0004)
0.0006
(0.0009)
0.0004
(0.0003)
0.0419***
(0.0116)
15,854,703
0.0032
0.0303

VARIABLES
Currently enrolled in BFP -0.0035***
(0.0005)
Female
Age
Log(Average income)
Constant

0.0537***
0.0528***
0.0445***
(0.0024)
(0.0024)
(0.0118)
Observations
17,322,182
17,322,182
17,322,182
R-squared
0.0031
0.0031
0.0032
Dependent variable mean
0.0308
0.0308
0.0308
(Clustered Standard Error in Parentheses)
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

While the magnitude of the coefficients seems small, they do make a sizable difference
due to our sample size of nearly 17 million and the low baseline percentage of children out of
school. For instance, in Table 4, we see that being currently enrolled in Bolsa Familia
decreases a child’s risk of dropping out by -0.35 percentage points. The baseline number of
children not in school for this sample is 3.08 percent, so a -0.35 percentage point difference
translates to nearly an -11% decrease. This means that being currently enrolled in Bolsa
Familia is helping to keep nearly 60,627 children in school who would have otherwise
dropped out.
Once we incrementally add controls, the results hold up and remain consistently
negative and extremely similar in magnitude. For instance, in column (4) on Table 4, the
probability of a child dropping out of school holding all other factors constant is -0.34
percentage points lower for current enrollees. The consistency and statistical significance of
our estimates indicate the validity of our initial LP results.
An important aspect in the literature of CCT’s is the impact that age has on school
outcomes. To investigate this further, we run all fixed effect regressions with age categories,
divided by primary age, lower secondary, and upper secondary. Tables 5 highlights these
outcomes. The estimate that is the largest in magnitude and significance is for primary-aged
children. For instance, a child under 10 belonging to a household currently receiving benefits
is -0.86 percentage points less likely to not be in school. According to this estimate, current
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enrollment in Bolsa Familia is helping to keep about 37,000 children under the age of 10 in
school. For lower secondary school, Bolsa Familia decreases the likelihood of dropping out
by -0.45. However, for high schoolers, we see differing results. The percentage point impact
diminishes significantly to -0.08 percentage points, meaning that Bolsa Familia is only
changing the school behavior of around 6,579 children over the age of 13, despite having a
total of 285,345 children out of school within this age range. These results are surprising in
that they indicate that Bolsa Familia encourages the largest enrollment shifts among the
youngest children. Much of the literature has contended that we witness the biggest gains in
school attendance for older children when it comes CCTs. Our basic LP model reveals a
different story. However, it is important to note that despite including several controls and
fixed effects, we still face issues of endogeneity and bias. There are likely important
confounding and unobserved features within the data. To eradicate this, we move to our next
identification strategy, a fuzzy regression discontinuity.

Table 5: Linear probability regression by age category with state and year fixed effects

VARIABLES

Dependent Variable: Not in school
(1)
(3)
Under 10
10 -13
years
years old

Currently enrolled in BFP

-0.0045***
(0.0003)
0.0225***
(0.0012)

-0.0008
(0.0007)
0.0164***
(0.0011)

Observations
4,314,971
4,784,032
R-squared
0.0455
0.0035
Dependent variable mean
0.0484
0.0084
(Clustered standard errors in parentheses)
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

8,223,179
0.0053
0.0347

Constant

-0.0086***
(0.0010)
0.1665***
(0.0086)

(5)
Over 13
years old

5.3 Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Results
Table 6 shows the fuzzy RDD results where contemporaneous Bolsa Familia
enrollment is instrumented. The sample observed is 7-17-year-old children, that belong to
households whose monthly income falls between R$18 above or below the threshold. While
our basic OLS models had around 17 million observations, this bandwidth narrows down our
observations to just above 950,000. The first stage results are extremely strong, with our
binary indicator of being below the threshold highly predictive of Bolsa Familia enrollment,
almost a 30-percentage point increase. Income centered on zero is a measure where the Bolsa
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Familia threshold is centered on zero, being below zero means you have an income that
qualifies enrollment, and being above zero means your income is too large and you do not
qualify. Therefore, our negative coefficient on income centered on zero aligns with what we
would expect, individuals whose average monthly income falls below the threshold are more
likely to be enrolled. Our first stage f-statistic is 14,830. Rule of thumb contends that a valid
first stage should have an f-statistic above 10. Figure 2 also visually reinforces the validity of
a clear program discontinuity, predicted by falling above or below the threshold. These
indicators leave us confident about our first stage and subsequent results.
The second stage outcome does indicate that current Bolsa Familia enrollment
significantly decreases the probability of a child not being in school. Our coefficient indicates
that there is about a -1.7 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of dropping out. While
the coefficient may appear small in magnitude, it translates to nearly a -53% decrease in the
risk of not being enrolled in school.
Table 6: Regression discontinuity with state and year fixed effects
VARIABLES
First Stage: Contemporaneous enrollment
Below threshold
0.2992***
(0.0025)
Income centered on zero
-0.0042***
(0.0002)
Interaction
0.0032***
(0.0003)
Constant
0.4253***
(0.0024)
Observations
F-value
R-squared

953,945
14830.5
0.1116
Second stage: Not in school

Estimated BFP enrollment
Income centered on zero
Interaction
Constant
Dependent variable mean
Above threshold
Below threshold

-0.0170***
(0.0032)
-0.0003**
(0.0001)
0.0002
(0.0001)
0.0350***
(0.0021)
0.0319
0.0305
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Within our narrow bandwidth of R$18 above and below the threshold, we estimate
that being currently enrolled in Bolsa Familia is responsible for keeping approximately
16,218 children in school who would have otherwise dropped out. While our results only
measure local average treatment, if we were to apply the percentage decrease to the total
sample, it would translate to nearly 294,478 children remaining in school. However, this
calculation is likely an underestimate, as our RDD sample was restricted to Bolsa Familia
recipients who had the highest income. As we move further away from the threshold, it is
likely the transfers change behavior even more drastically, greatly reducing the risk of
dropping out.
Graphically, we do see a discontinuity at the threshold of the percentage of children
not in school. Figure 4 plots out the residual estimates of those not in school by Bolsa Familia
enrollment using a linear fit. For those under the threshold, there appears to be a fairly flat
line which jumps at the threshold and begins on an upward slope. Figure 5 utilizes the same
data, only we employ a local polynomial fit.
Figure 4: Not in school discontinuity linear fit
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Figure 5: Not in school local polynomial fit

In our basic LP model, we found an interesting pattern regarding age. It was observed
that Bolsa Familia had a large influence on bolstering school enrollment for primary-aged
children. With this in mind, we divided our RDD into the same age buckets as the LP model:
under 10 years, 10 to 13 years, and 13 years and older. The output can be found in Table 7.
Surprisingly, our results diverge from the LP model, in that Bolsa Familia enrollment seems
to have quantitative and qualitative significance amongst all ages. We see meaningful
reductions for primary, middle, and high school-aged children. For the youngest children,
being currently enrolled in Bolsa Familia reduces the risk of not being in school by -2.69
percentage points or nearly -55%. For the oldest children, we see a reduction of -1.27
percentage points or about -35%. For middle-schoolers, the results are a bit more complex.
Children between the ages of 10-13 are out of school at the lowest rates, so any gain from
Bolsa Familia makes a sizable impact. Our findings are very interesting since much of the
literature only points to seeing enrollment gains amongst high schoolers. However, we
witness meaningful reductions in school non-enrollment for each age category.
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Table 7: Fuzzy regression discontinuity by age category with state and year fixed effects
VARIABLES
Below threshold
Income centered on zero
Interaction
Constant
Observations
F-value
R-Squared
Estimated BFP enrollment
Income centered on zero
Interaction
Constant
Dependent variable mean
Above threshold
Below threshold

(1)
(2)
Under 10 years
10-13 years
First Stage for contemporaneous enrollment
0.2975***
0.2973***
(0.0052)
(0.0047)
-0.0041***
-0.0040***
(0.0005)
(0.0005)
0.0030***
0.0026***
(0.0006)
(0.0006)
0.4460***
0.4278***
(0.0052)
(0.0047)
208,922
256,066
3320.92
3962.92
0.1126
0.1114
Second stage: Not in school
-0.0269***
-0.0096**
(0.0092)
(0.0038)
-0.0006**
-0.0001
(0.0003)
(0.0001)
0.0006*
0.00021
(0.0003)
(0.0001)
0.0450***
0.0144***
(0.0061)
(0.0024)

(3)
Over 13 years

0.0488
0.0100
0.0567
0.0087
Robust standard errors in parentheses
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

0.0363
0.0306

0.3005***
(0.0035)
-0.0043***
(0.0003)
0.0035***
(0.0004)
0.41508***
(0.0034)
488,957
7537.86
0.1109
-0.0127***
(0.0042)
-0.0002
(0.0001)
0.0000
(0.0001)
0.0398***
(0.0028)

To further investigate the effect of age, we reran our RDD model for each individual
age, as seen in Table 8.
Table 8: Second stage fuzzy regression discontinuity results for each age
Estimated BFP
Enrollment
Age 7
Age 8
Age 9
Age 10
Age 11
Age 12
Age 13
Age 14
Age 15
Age 16

Current enrollment
Estimate
N
(standard error)
-0.0340
63,865
(0.0211)
-0.0232
70,258
(0.0154)
-0.0175**
74,799
(0.0085)
-0.0137*
80,006
(0.0074)
-0.0066
86,587
(0.0063)
-0.0089
89,473
(0.0060)
-0.0164***
92,201
(0.0046)
-0.0150***
96,286
(0.0047)
-0.0165**
99,051
(0.0075)
-0.0304
101,083
(0.0105)
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Table 8 illustrates the second stage of our RDD model. Ages 13, 14, 15, and 16 seem
to have the most quantitative and qualitative significance. Meanwhile, Figure 6 plots the
estimates found in the Table 8. Like the table, we see the largest reductions amongst primary
and high school-aged children. However, it appears that the estimate is much nosier for
primary-aged children, depicted by the wider confidence intervals. We see the smallest
magnitude amongst middle-schoolers; however, this group is already out of school at the
lowest rates. Our RDD results lead us to conclude that Bolsa Familia is effective for all ages,
but especially children between the ages of 13 to 17.
Figure 6: Bolsa Familia’s impact on school dropout

5.3 Robustness Checks
To ensure our results are valid, we conduct several robustness checks. We assume
that as we minimize the neighborhood and get closer to the threshold our estimated
program effects should stay stable. However, to ensure this is the case we need to check
that there are no signs of manipulation such as a large jump in observations right below the
income cutoff. If we witness a large difference in the density of observations, it would
indicate that recipients are able to successfully alter their reported monthly income to
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receive benefits. To test this, we construct Figure 7, which was generated by artificially
creating a 1,000 different threshold and conducting a test statistic (on the x-axis) that
indicates if there is a significant difference in density above and below said threshold. Once
mapped out, it should take the form of a normal distribution centered on zero. If there was
absolutely no significant difference in density above and below the threshold, we would
expect to see our true cutoff point centered on zero. In this case, our true threshold falls
slightly below zero at about -0.25, however, it still does not indicate a significant difference
in density above and below the threshold. Coupling this with the difficulty that it takes to
backward engineer and predict the income qualification, we believe that there are little to
no signs of manipulation.
Figure 7: McCrary Test

Another common robustness check used in RDD analysis is estimating the model with
different sized bandwidths. This checks the sensitivity of our estimates to alternative
specifications. We rerun the total analysis with a bandwidth of [-24, 24] and [-12, 12]. Our
original bandwidth of [-18, 18] indicated that Bolsa Familia reduces school dropout by -1.5
percentage points. The larger bandwidth estimates a -1.49 reduction, and our smaller
bandwidth estimates a -1.02 percentage point reduction. These estimates are similar in
magnitude and remain significant at the p<0.05 level. Table 9 illustrates these findings.
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Table 9: Fuzzy regression discontinuity with differing bandwidths

VARIABLES
Below threshold
Income centered on zero
Interaction
Constant
Observations
F-value
R-squared
Estimated BFP enrollment
Income centered on zero
Interaction
Constant
Dependent variable mean
Above threshold
Below threshold

(1)
(2)
[-12, 12]
[-18, 18]
Bandwidth
Bandwidth
First Stage: Contemporaneous enrollment
0.2856***
0.2992***
(0.0033)
(0.0025)
-0.0063***
-0.0042***
(0.0004)
(0.0002)
0.0045***
0.0032***
(0.0005)
(0.0003)
0.4259***
0.4253***
(0.0067)
(0.0024)
650,301
953,945
7312.71
14830.5
0.1100
0.1116
Second stage: Not in school
-0.0102**
-0.0170***
(0.0046)
(0.0032)
-0.0001
-0.0003**
(0.0002)
(0.0001)
0.0004*
0.0002
(0.0002)
(0.0001)
0.0358***
0.0350***
(0.0038)
(0.0021)
0.0320
0.0319
0.0298
0.0305
Robust standard errors in parentheses)
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

(3)
[-24, 24]
Bandwidth
0.2947***
(0.0020)
-0.0033***
(0.0002)
0.0010***
(0.0002)
0.4415***
(0.0045)
1,325,409
21775.8
0.1203
-0.0149***
(0.0026)
-0.0002***
(0.0001)
0.0002**
(0.0001)
0.0380***
(0.0023)
0.0316
0.0295

Next, we implement a variety of fixed effects before settling on state and year.
Originally, we ran all models with municipality fixed effects. The results from these
estimations remained consistent once we changed to state-level, as this is the level at which
educational policy is decided. Finally, we completed both our LP and RDD models with
robust standard errors, and then again with clustered standard errors. Again, this examines
how sensitive our estimate is to different econometric specifications. In each analysis, our
standard errors and coefficients remain extremely similar, and we do not lose significance or
magnitude.

6. Conclusion
These results suggest that Bolsa Familia effectively lowers school dropout rates for
program beneficiaries. We first utilized a LP model to establish a relationship between Bolsa
Familia enrollment and school outcomes. The model finds that being enrolled in Bolsa
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Familia reduces a child’s risk of dropping out by -0.35 percentage points, or -11%. Next, we
employ a fuzzy RDD model which is more rigorous quasi-experimental approach that helps
eradicate bias The fuzzy RDD amplified the probability LP results and finds that being
enrolled in Bolsa Familia reduces the risk of not being in school by -1.7 percentage points or
-53%. At its genesis, Bolsa Familia was created to boost human capital by incentivizing school
enrollment through monetary transfers. Our study finds that the transfer is effective in
helping children stay in school. We observe a narrow neighborhood of 18 above and 18 below
the threshold and see a significant difference in school enrollment rates. By looking at
individuals that make within R$36 of each other, we assume that they should be extremely
comparable, with the only distinction being program enrollment. Therefore, the significant
difference in school enrollment must be attributed to Bolsa Familia.
Prior studies have had limited access to enrollment data, specifically only one round
of the National Household Survey (PNAD). Our novel administrative dataset was
reconstructed into a panel format, making it conducive for a quasi-experimental approach
that uncovers the causal effects of Bolsa Familia. We see meaningful reductions in school
non-enrollment for all ages. Previous literature on CCT’s has pointed to the strongest results
amongst high school-aged children. However, our RDD analysis found that primary-aged
children belonging to recipient families are -2.69 percentage points or -55% less likely to not
be in school than their non-recipient counterparts. For high-schoolers, Bolsa Familia reduces
their risk of dropout by -1.27 percentage points or -35%. These results are a major
contribution to the literature, in that they point to the broad effectiveness of CCT programs.
While this study examined the conditional threshold of Bolsa Familia, there is another
extension of the program that remains unstudied, the unconditional portion. We determined
that the conditions attached are effective in changing school attendance behavior, however,
is the same true in the absence of conditions? Future areas of research that apply the same
econometric approach but look at the extreme poverty line, where individuals with a monthly
income below R$89 receive a fixed benefit, and those above receive a conditional benefit,
would add an interesting dimension to the CCT literature. Given this novel administrative
dataset and rigorous quasi-experimental approach, we confidently conclude that Bolsa
Familia is extremely effective in lowering school dropout rates, and we provide a replicable
model and data for future studies.
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Appendix A:
Bolsa Familia Conditional Benefit Timeline
2007

2003

Bolsa Familia is created
Income threshold is R$100
Maximum variable
benefit is R$45
Variable benefit for children
0-14: R$15

Income threshold is R$120
Maximum variable
benefit is R$54
Variable benefit for children
0-14: R$18

06/2012

Income threshold is R$140
Maximum variable
benefit is R$236
Variable benefit for children
0-14: R$32
Variable benefit for children
15-17: R$38
Variable benefit for pregnant
women: R$32

2009

Income threshold is R$120
Maximum variable
benefit is R$110
Variable benefit for children
0-15: R$20
Variable benefit for children
16-17: R$30

Income threshold is R$140
Maximum variable
benefit is R$32
Variable benefit for children
0-15: R$22
Variable benefit for children
16-17: R$33

12/2012

2013

Income threshold is R$140
Maximum variable
benefit is R$236
Variable benefit for children
0-14: R$32
Variable benefit for children
15-17: R$38
Variable benefit for pregnant
women: R$32

Income threshold is R$140
Maximum variable
benefit is R$236
Variable benefit for children
0-14: R$32
Variable benefit for children
15-17: R$38
Variable benefit for pregnant
women: R$32
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11/2011

03/2011

2008

Income threshold is R$140
Maximum variable
benefit is R$172
Variable benefit for children
0-15: R$32
Variable benefit for children
16-17: R$38

2014

Income threshold is R$154
Maximum variable
benefit is R$259
Variable benefit for children
0-14: R$35
Variable benefit for children
15-17: R$42
Variable benefit for pregnant
women: R$35

Income threshold is R$140
Maximum variable
benefit is R$236
Variable benefit for children
0-14: R$32
Variable benefit for children
15-17: R$38
Variable benefit for pregnant
women: R$32

2018

Income threshold is R$178
Maximum variable
benefit is R$301
Variable benefit for children
0-14: R$41
Variable benefit for children
15-17: R$48
Variable benefit for pregnant
women: R$41

Appendix B: Sample Benefit Distributions

2003

Age 2
R$15

2007

Age
6
R$15

Age 4

Age 6

Age 10

R$18

R$18

R$18

Total Benefit: R$30

2011

2009

2008

Age 5

Age 7

R$20

R$20

Age 11
R$20

Age 6

Age 12

Age 8

R$22

R$22 R$22

Total Benefit: R$54

Total Benefit: R$60

Total Benefit: R$66

2013

2014

2018

R$32

Age 8
R$32

Age 10
R$32

Age 14
R$32

Total Benefit:
R$128

Age 3

Age 2 Age 10 Age 12 Age 16
R$32

R$32

R$35

R$32 R$38

Age 11 Age 13 Age 17
R$35

R$35

Total Benefit:
R$147

Total Benefit:
R$134
32

R$42

Age 7 Age 15 Age 17 Age 21
R$41

R$41

R$48

Total Benefit:
R$130

R$0

Appendix C: Changing income threshold

Income Cutoff

Bolsa Familia Monthly Income Threshold

Year
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Appendix D: Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG)
Controls
• Age
• Gender
•

Bolsa Familia Enrollment
Measurements ("! )
•
•

School Outcome Measurements
(!)
• Not in school

Enrolled in Bolsa Familia
Current enrollment

•

Controls
Log average income
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